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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)

Queen Elizabeth Class
 

Part 11

             Article Parts 

 1. Current Project Status and
     Graphics

  2. Specification

  3. The Project and its Origins

  4. Role

  5. Smart Procurement

  6. Project Schedule

  7. Procurement Process I
      (until Jan 2003)

  8. Procurement Process II  
      (until July 2007)

  9. Procurement Process III
      (latest situation)

10. Management and Industry
       Structures

11. Aviation Operations

12. STOVL or CV F-35?

13. Platform Design ...

14. ... and Redesign

15. C4ISR Facilities

16. Operational Concepts

17. Crew, Accommodation &
       Habitability

18. Propulsion and Engineering

19. Manufacture

20. Build Problems and UK
      Content

21. Basing and Support

22. Costs

23. Air Group

24. Aviation Requirements and
       Facilities

25. Catapults and Arresting Gear

26. Armament and Armour

27. Operations

28. Names

29. CVF Links



 

 

Aviation Operations

Operational analysis in 1997 suggested that aircraft carriers operating 50 aircraft would be required to ensure campaign success in medium-intensity scenarios, and this required a ship of some 30,000 to 40,000 tons [sic] displacement, operating 50 aircraft in overload capacity.  This was accepted in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the Future Aircraft Carrier project project was formally launched in January 1999.

The contending designs for the CVF requirement originally (1999) consisted of three basic aircraft operation variants:

  1. An aircraft carrier with ski-jump and axial deck layout equipped to handle Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft such as an advanced Harrier or the planned new RN/USMC Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) STOVL variant.

  2. An aircraft carrier fitted with angled deck, ski-jump and arrestor gear (similar to the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov) to handle Short Take Off but Arrested Landing (STOBAR) aircraft such as a navalised EF-2000 Typhoon (Eurofighter). 

  3. An aircraft carrier fitted with angled deck, catapults and arrestor gear to handle Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft such as the French Rafale M, American F/A-18E Super Hornet, or the US Navy (CV) variant of the JSF.  This type of operation is also known in American parlance as Catapult Take Off and Arrested landing (CATOBAR).

in 2000 a fourth option emerged:

  1. A hybrid carrier.  For example, a STOVL hybrid would have some steam catapults and arrestors needed for conventional aircraft such as the E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft, while a conventional take-off hybrid would have a ramp at the front of the flight deck for STOVL planes. 

and finally in 2002 a fifth option:

  1. An adaptable carrier.  A CTOL type carrier modified for STOVL operations with a bow ski-jump, but still able to be fitted catapults and arrestor gear if required at some point in the future.

Lacking heavy and bulky catapults and arrestor gear the STOVL configured carrier design was always anticipated to be the smallest and cheapest option, and to make best use of existing RN and RAF experience and training with the Harrier.  It was also considered that a given number of STOVL aircraft can maintain a higher sortie rate than the same number of STOBAR or CTOL aircraft. 

CTOL and STOBAR hulls require two "runways" to enable simultaneous launch and recovery operations, and are therefore larger than STOVL ships of otherwise similar capabilities.

A STOBAR design requires a longer runway for launch than the CTOL variant does for catapult operations (150 -180 metres versus 75 or 90 metres) and is therefore even larger (and possibly more expensive). STOBAR therefore combines the take-off limitations of STOVL with the cost disadvantages of CTOL and was always unlikely to be chosen.

However, CTOL has some significant advantages.  For example the purchase of off-the-shelf aircraft such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E-2C Hawkeye 2000 would avoid the risks and cost of developing a new STOVL fighter and a new AEW aircraft - thereby mitigating the greater cost of the carrier platform and the higher "fly-away" unit plane cost.  Also, CTOL aircraft can generally launch and land at higher weights than STOVL aircraft, giving them considerable advantages in terms of payload and range.  And with CTOL carriers the RN would be able to cross-deck aircraft with the French and US navies.

Table 1: Summary of Characteristics of the CVF Options

Feature STOVL [Eliminated September 2002] STOBAR
[Eliminated January 2001] [1]
Adaptive
[Selected September 2002]
Hybrid
[Eliminated January 2001]
CTOL
[Eliminated September 2002] [2]
Ski Jump Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Arrestor Gear No Yes No
[Future Option]
Yes Yes
Catapults No No No
[Future Option]
Yes (one) Yes (two)
Hull Size Smallest Large Large Large Medium
Desk Parking space
(for given hull size)
High Low High Lowest Medium
CVF Platform Cost Lowest Medium Medium High Highest
FCBA/JCA Options
  
JSF STOVL
Super Harrier
Sea Typhoon (most likely)
JSF STOVL
[Future options for other aircraft]
JSF STOVL

JSF CV
Super Hornet
Rafale M
FOAEW Options
  
Merlin ASC
V-22 Osprey
UVAV
Merlin ASC
V-22 Osprey
UVAV
 E-2 Hawkeye?
Merlin ASC
V-22 Osprey
UVAV
[Option for other aircraft]
Merlin ASC
V-22 Osprey
E-2 Hawkeye
UAV
Merlin ASC
V-22 Osprey
E-2 Hawkeye
UAV
JCA STOVL Capability (RAF requirement) Yes No Yes Yes No
JCA Performance - Payload/Range/Bringback Lowest Medium Lowest Medium Highest
JCA Survivability Lowest Highest Lowest Lowest Highest
USN/FN Cross-Decking No No No
[Future Option]
Yes Yes
Training/Skills Current New Current New and Current New
Sortie Rate High Medium High High Lowest
Bad Weather Operations Excellent Good Excellent Good-Excellent Good

Notes:

1. STOBAR was re-proposed in late 2002.
2. CTOL has again been under consideration since summer 2003. 

A BAE Systems CATOBAR CVF concept, c.2003The choice of CVF configuration was expected to be effectively made in late 2000 when the selection of an aircraft to meet the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement was originally scheduled to be announced.  The STOVL configuration of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had long been officially considered a strong favourite for FCBA/FJCA, but the JSF programme was  experiencing lengthy delays and the STOVL demonstrators did not fly until early 2001.  Somewhat surprisingly in view of the delays to the JSF trials, in late 2000 the MoD Equipment Acquisition Committee (EAC) recommended procurement of JSF for JCA, expressing as expected a preference for STOVL.  Still without waiting for the success (or otherwise) of the JSF technology demonstrator trials to become clear, on 17 January 2000 the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the USA committing $2 billion (over £1.3 billion) to the next Engineering and Manufacturing and Development (EMD) for JSF.  This decision was necessary to enable the UK to remain a full partner in the JSF programme, but the MOD carefully avoided choosing between the STOVL or CV variants at this somewhat premature stage.  The UK also announced that another £600 million had been allocated to modifying JSF to UK requirements and integrating it with CVF.  On 26 October 2001 it was announced by the American Department of Defence that Lockheed Martin had been chose as prime contractor to develop and build the Joint Strike Fighter, now designated the F-35.

Since summer 2004, the UK has been investigating the possibility of shipborne rolling vertical landings (SRVL) for the F-35B, to help increase its bring-back capabilities - indeed this sixth option has been increasingly favoured.

 

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 © 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.